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a b s t r a c t
Developing countries are increasingly seen as competitors in knowledge intensive activities. However,
their rapidly growing innovation potential suggests that they will become important producers of
technology demanded by other countries, and at the same time, they will increase their demand for
technology produced elsewhere. To study the evolution, composition and drivers of international
technology sourcing between a developing country and the rest of the world, we look at the case of
China. To quantify these technology ﬂows we use patent-based measures of cross-border ownership of
inventions and a patent database providing worldwide coverage of patents. We show that although
China has a large deﬁcit in international technology sourcing, the ﬂow of technology from abroad to
China and vice versa is intensifying. In both directions of technology sourcing, we observe strong
concentration in terms of partners and technological ﬁelds. While geographic distance hinders the
technology ﬂow from China to other countries, it does not impede Chinese entities from acquiring
property rights over inventions developed by inventors from distant countries. China maintains
intensive linkages with a number of relatively small and developing countries. This way it accelerates
the process of South–South interactions in international technology sourcing.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The impressive growth in inventive output of some of the
developing countries, e.g. China, has attracted the attention of
scholars, policy makers and company executives (De Prato et al.,
2013; Petti, 2012; Sun and Du, 2010). To a large extent, this
attention is driven by the rising power of developing countries
as newly-emerging competitors in knowledge intensive activities.
In contrast, hardly any interest is paid to the issue of international
technology sourcing from and to developing countries (Ramamurti
and Singh, 2010). However, it seems to be a natural step that
developing countries will become important producers of tech-
nology demanded by other countries, and that, at the same time,
they will increase their demand for technology developed abroad
to complement their own technological resources. It can already
be said that, of the developing countries, China is one of the largest
foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2012). Indian and Chinese ﬁrms
abroad are not only expanding their sales and manufacturing
activities, but they are also enhancing their technological capabil-
ities. Similarly, foreign investments in developing countries are
increasingly focusing on knowledge-intensive activities, including
R&D and technology sourcing.
Considering the above, this paper will provide evidence on the
process of international technology sourcing between developing
countries and the rest of the world. We have chosen China as our
focus because its inventive capacity has grown signiﬁcantly. We
address the following questions: First, what is the magnitude of
technology sourcing and what is the net balance of technology
exchange between China and the rest of the world? Second, how is
this process evolving over time? Third, which countries are China's
key technological collaboration partners? Fourth, what are the
main technological ﬁelds in which this collaboration takes place?
Finally, what factors facilitate technology sourcing between China
and the rest of the world?
One of the reasons why there is no complete picture of the
position and dynamics of China in the process of international
technology sourcing is the lack of information. We solve this issue
by using measures and data with comprehensive coverage of the
technological linkages between China and the rest of the world.
Our empirical analysis uses patent-based indicators of interna-
tional technology sourcing. In particular, we use measures of
technology internationalisation that capture the issue of cross-
border ownership of inventors as deﬁned by Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), i.e. where an applicant holding
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property rights over an invention resides in a different country
than the inventor who developed this invention. These measures
allow us to capture the phenomenon of technology sourcing,
which is deﬁned as either a transaction or a long-term collabora-
tion between two parties, in which the acquirer and supplier of
technology are involved (Bennett, 2002). We use PATSTAT as a data
source, because it is the most comprehensive patent dataset
available, provided by the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) containing
a worldwide coverage of patent applications submitted to more
than 90 patent ofﬁces in the world. Querying the entire database
allows us to map and quantify the intensity of technology sourcing
between China and the rest of the world. In order to explain the
drivers behind the international technology sourcing to and from
China, we use the gravity model. We include the most relevant
ﬁndings from previous research on international technology sour-
cing identiﬁed as the key drivers of this process.
We chose to analyse China because it belongs to the group of
economies that are expanding most at present. In addition, it is
also a destination for R&D-related Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
(Chen and Reger, 2006; Nepelski and De Prato, 2012). Despite the
current interest in China (Abraham and Moitra, 2001; Ernst, 2005;
Liu and White, 2001; Simon, 2011; Yang, 2012), little attention is
devoted to China's outward internationalization. Notable excep-
tions include studies of recent corporate evolution in China. These
studies focus on the increased internationalization of Chinese
ﬁrms in the form of outward foreign direct investment ﬂows and
overseas mergers and acquisitions (Athreye and Kapur, 2009).
To our knowledge, there has been no comprehensive attempt to
assess China's strength as a producer of technology sourced to
other countries and as a procurer of technology developed else-
where. Some of the studies focusing on China and international
technology include Zhang et al. (2007) and De La Tour et al. (2011).
The former study concentrates on a limited number of companies,
and the latter addresses only one narrowly deﬁned technological
ﬁeld. Thus, due to its scope, i.e. the whole world, our study
complements the existing evidence and extends our understand-
ing of the role of China in the process of international technology
sourcing in a global context.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews
the available literature on international technology sourcing.
Section 3 formulates the gravity model used to explain the
patterns of international technology sourcing between China and
the rest of the world. Section 4 introduces the data and measures
used in the study. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical
ﬁndings. Section 6 offers conclusions and formulates some theo-
retical and practical implications. Section 8 includes a technical
Appendix.
2. Literature review
Over the last few decades, an intensive process of redistribution
of production across the world has taken place (Meyers et al.,
2008; UNESCO, 2010; Van der Zee, 2006). As part of the spatial
division of economic activity, a number of large corporations have
begun to seek new knowledge opportunities worldwide (Bartlett
and Ghoshal, 1990; Dunning, 1994; Teece, 1977). Increasingly,
companies are making R&D-related investments abroad and tap-
ping into R&D sources outside their home countries, or accessing
knowledge and technology assets abroad. Thus they are building a
new kind of competitive advantage by discovering, accessing,
mobilising, and leveraging knowledge from a number of locations
across the globe (Doz et al., 2001). An implication of the process of
international technology sourcing is the emergence of a global
network of technology development (De Prato and Nepelski,
2014). The dynamics and structure of the network are constantly
changing as new linkages between the existing players are created
and as new actors enter the markets. In this context, two of the
most important questions in the evolution of the global economy
are what effects FDI has on the economies of host and domestic
countries and what determines FDI related to technology sourcing
(Drifﬁeld and Love, 2007).
Regarding the effects of international technology sourcing, a
relevant question is how it affects the competitiveness of both
domestic and host countries. The importance of this issue is
related to the fact that, mainly in developed countries, there is a
concern that following the offshoring of production activities,
large multinationals will relocate R&D activities. The increasing
technological capacities of developing countries, particularly in
Asia, are seen as competition for R&D resources, which may
negatively affect R&D investments and employment in the devel-
oped countries and, in the long term, the domestic knowledge
base. This is ampliﬁed by the fact that R&D-related FDI takes place
primarily in knowledge intensive industries, such as the ICT,
chemical or pharmaceutical sectors, i.e. industries seen as essential
to advanced economies. It is perceived that the potential loss of
local inventive capacity in these industries could harm the
competitiveness of the knowledge-based economy and undermine
its development.
One of the ﬁrst attempts to address the question of how
internationalisation of technology sourcing affects both domestic
and host countries ﬁnds a connection between the internationa-
lisation of R&D activities and economic performance (Coe and
Helpman, 1995). Coe and Helpman (1995) extended the theories of
economic growth that treat commercially-oriented innovation as a
major engine of technological progress. They argue that technolo-
gical progress depends not only on domestic R&D capital but also
on foreign R&D capital. They conclude that foreign R&D has
beneﬁcial effects on domestic productivity. These effects are
stronger the more open an economy is to foreign trade. However,
in a later study, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg
(2001) show that FDI transfers technology, but only in one
direction. A country's productivity is increased only if it invests
in R&D-intensive foreign countries and there is no positive effect
on its productivity if foreign R&D-intensive countries invest in it.
While the former result is conﬁrmed by studies of individual
countries, e.g. Germany (Herzer, 2011), the latter is challenged by a
study of China. Zhang (2013) ﬁnds that the role of FDI increases
with FDI inﬂows over the period, and changes in FDI affect
changes in industrial performance.
This paper places the drivers of international technology
sourcing in the context of the globalization of economic and
inventive activity. The most important drivers are seen as non-
transferable and location-speciﬁc resources (Boutellier et al., 2008;
Dunning, 1988, 1994; Kuemmerle, 1999; Narula, 2003). These
resources include inputs to R&D activity, e.g. scientists and
universities, or knowledge about customers and markets
(Dunning, 1988, 1994). Another reason for engaging in interna-
tional technology sourcing is to access a particular market. Hence,
the potential size of the economy should be also taken as a
predictor of link formation between countries.
Empirical research on the motives behind international tech-
nology sourcing has two dimensions. The ﬁrst is the unit of
observation, i.e. ﬁrm versus country. The second is the geographic
scope. For example, at the ﬁrm level, Belderbos et al. (2014)
examine the drivers of international technology sourcing strate-
gies of Flemish ﬁrms. They show that technology sourcing is
practiced by ﬁrms that face resource limitations. Also Song and
Shin (2008) and Penner-Hahn and Shaver (2005) have carried out
studies at the ﬁrm level and ﬁnd that, for transfers to be effective,
ﬁrms must have sufﬁcient ‘absorptive capacity’ to utilise foreign
know-how and R&D results. Similarly, Grevesen and Damanpour
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(2007) use survey data to study innovative performance in over-
seas R&D at the company level. At a more aggregate level that
includes a larger number of countries, a number of studies
describe the process of international technology production
and their drivers (Boutellier et al., 2008; Dunning, 1988, 1994;
Kuemmerle, 1999; Narula, 2003). Their conclusions show that
international R&D activity can help multinational ﬁrms to exploit
their ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources, improve their local responsiveness,
and ensure sustainable competitive advantages globally.
Summing up, the determinants of international technology
sourcing fall into two groups: economic capacity and inventive
performance of countries involved in technology exchange and
innovative collaboration (Dachs and Pyka, 2010; Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Pari Patel and Pavitt, 1991;
Picci, 2010). In the following section, we formulate an empirically
testable model of technology sourcing from and to China by
building on existing studies that explain the motives behind
international technology sourcing.
3. Modelling the determinants of international technology
sourcing
As explained above, there are different motives that drive
actors from one country to look for complementary technological
resources abroad and there is no comprehensive theoretical model
explaining the intensity of technology sourcing between countries.
The closest concept suitable for an empirical analysis of technol-
ogy seeking and sourcing across borders is the gravity model,
which is commonly applied to analysing international trade
between countries (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011). As this
approach has already been used to study the issue of the inter-
nationalisation of technological activity (De Prato and Nepelski,
2014; Picci, 2010; Thomson, 2011), we apply it in the current study
as well. This speciﬁcation allows us to deﬁne and test the
importance of the drivers of international or technological colla-
boration between countries.






where two countries, ci and cj, with non-negative GDP and
geographic distance Dij, are expected to develop a positive
exchange link (i.e. Lij ¼ 1). The logic behind the gravity model is
that countries which are not distant from each other are also more
likely to trade or interact with each other. It is worth noting that
the notion of distance has been extended over time and ranges
from geographic distance to economic, technological or cultural
proximity. All these factors have been found relevant in explaining
why countries trade with each other (De Benedictis and Tajoli,
2011) or undertake joint technology development efforts (Picci,
2010).
Regarding the construction of the dependent variable, our
analysis uses measures of technology sourcing internationalisation
that are based on patent data. We follow the methodology
proposed by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001),
which builds on the fact that each patent application has a list of
inventors (i.e. the people who developed a particular invention)
and a list of applicants (i.e. the people or organizations that own
the property rights for this invention). In this context, we observe
technology sourcing from abroad to China whenever an applicant
residing in China owns an invention developed by an inventor
residing in a different country. The sum of all the patents with
foreign inventors owned by applicants residing in China is a proxy
for technology ﬂow to China from country j, showing the total
number of patents with applicants residing in China and inventors




ACNp  Ijp: ð2Þ
In contrast, in order to measure technology sourcing from
China to other countries, we look for patents with Chinese
inventors, which belong to applicants residing outside of China.
This can be formally expressed as the number of patents with
inventors residing in China that are owned by applicants residing





ICNp  Ajp: ð3Þ
There are signiﬁcant differences with respect to the number of
patents and the number of international patents across countries.
This has implications for an analysis of the levels of technological
internationalisation. For example, Japan or the US may have the
highest absolute number of patents. However, these countries have
followed different technology development internationalisation
paths and the intensity of their technological ties with different
countries varies (Nepelski and De Prato, 2012). Thus, in order to
control for the size effect, we use the index of “revealed geographical
distribution” (RGD) deﬁned by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie (2001). This index is based on the Balassa measure of
revealed comparative advantage (Balassa, 1965), extensively applied
in international analysis of trade or technological specialisation
(Bernhofen and Brown, 2004; Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
In the context of international technology sourcing to China,
the index represents the share of patent applications with inven-
tors residing in country j and owned by applicants residing in
China in the total number of patent applications with foreign
inventors and owned by applicants residing in China divided by
the share of patent applications with inventors residing in country
j and owned by foreign applicants in the total number of patent
applications subject to cross border ownership. The RGD or the
relative importance of technology source of country j for China can








where AICNj=AICN: is the share of country j inventions owned by
applicants residing in China in the total number of patent
applications with foreign inventors owned by applicants residing
in China. AI:j=AI:: is the share of country j’s inventions owned by
foreign residents in the world wide patents subject to foreign
ownership.
On the other hand, while looking at international technology
sourcing from China, the index measures the relative importance
of China as a source of technology for country j. It is equal to the
share of inventions developed by inventors residing in China
owned by applicants residing in country j in the total number of
patent applications with foreign inventors owned by applicants
residing in country j divided by the share of China's inventions
owned by foreign applicants in the total number of patents subject
to cross-border ownership worldwide. Thus, the RGD of China in








where IACNj=IA:j is the share of inventions developed by Chinese
inventors owned by applicants from country j in the total number
of foreign inventions owned by applicants from that country.
IACN:=IA:: is the share of inventions developed by inventors resid-
ing in China owned by foreign applicants in the total number of
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inventions subject to cross-border ownership. We use the two
measures deﬁned above as proxies of the intensity of technology
sourcing between China and the rest of the world.
Concerning the drivers of international technology sourcing,
the formation of technology sourcing linkages between countries
depends on more factors than their GDP and distance. To explain
the relationships between the intensity of technology sourcing
between China and other countries, we use a number of variables
that are related to a country’ characteristics in the following areas:
geographical proximity, economic size and openness to foreign
investments and, ﬁnally, research intensity of China's technology
sourcing partners. Thus, the function of the intensity of technology
sourcing to China from other countries takes the following form:
RGD_AICNjt ¼ f ðDistCNj;GDPjt ; FDIjt ; IPjt ;Rgj;α; εijtÞ ð6Þ
where RGD_AICNjt represents the relative importance of country j
as a foreign source of technology sourced by applicants residing in
China at time t as deﬁned in (4). It is computed based on the
number of patented inventions owned by Chinese applicants and
developed by inventors residing in country j in time
tAð1990; 2009Þ. Similarly, our function of the determinants of
technology sourcing from China to the rest of the world can be
written as:
RGD_IACNjt ¼ f ðDistjCN ;GDPjt ; FDIjt ; IPjt ;Rgj;α; εijtÞ ð7Þ
where RGD_IACNjt represents the relative importance China as a
foreign source of technology for country j, as deﬁned in (5), in time
tAð1990; 2009Þ. In both cases, error term is given by εijt and
controls for unobserved effects.
The variables listed above can be explained as follows: con-
cerning the geographical proximity, we use a variable controlling
for the distance between China and country j, DistCNj. Moreover,
we include a dummy variable Rgj; indicating the region of country
j, i.e. Europe, the US, Japan, Asia or the rest of the world (RoW). It is
worth mentioning that we considered using a variable to control
for the presence of common language as a proxy for cultural
proximity. However, as Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan
are the only places that share Chinese as a common language,
language is an inappropriate measure.
Regarding economic size of countries linked through techno-
logical sourcing, information on GDP (in current US$) of country j
in period t is included. In order to control for the internationalisa-
tion of economic activity, we also include measures of incoming
FDI for country j in period t (in current US$). Measures of GDP and
FDI are supposed to account for the economic attractiveness and
openness of countries involved in international technology sour-
cing with China.
In addition, as we expect that not only distance hinders and
economic factors facilitate international technology sourcing, we
control for the inventive performance (IP) of China's technology
sourcing partners. Inventive performance is proxied by the ratio of
the number of patent applications with inventors residing in a
country on the country's population at time t. This has a double
interpretation. On the one hand, the measure of inventive perfor-
mance of a country reﬂects its inventive capacity that may attract
technological collaboration partners from China. On the other
hand, it may be a proxy of absorptive capacity of a country, which
is likely to facilitate international technology sourcing.
4. Indicators construction and data sources
As mentioned in the previous section, we use patent-based
data on technology sourcing internationalisation. Thus, it must be
mentioned that patent data as a proxy of invention or technolo-
gical progress and of the internationalisation of technology
production have some shortcomings (de Rassenfosse et al.,
2013). However, this source of data is considered one of the best
measures of inventing capability and an important method of
assessing various aspects of technological change (Griliches, 1990),
including the issue of internationalisation of R&D (Archibugi and
Planta, 1996; Patel and Pavitt, 1997). Moreover, the measures
applied in this study allow us to capture the phenomenon of
technology sourcing, which is deﬁned as either a transaction or a
long-term collaboration between two parties, in which the
acquirer and supplier of technology are involved (Bennett, 2002).
This justiﬁes the use of patent-based measures of international
technology sourcing in the current study.
The patent-based indicators proposed in this study aim to
provide the best measure of the inventive capability of countries,
rather than the productivity of patent ofﬁces. We consider only
‘priority patent applications’; this means that, to avoid double-
counting, only the ﬁrst ﬁling of an application is considered and all
the possible successive ﬁlings of the same invention to different
patent ofﬁces are not counted again.
Regarding assigning patents to countries, there are two com-
mon methodologies (Dernis et al., 2001). It is possible to refer to
either the declared country of residence of the inventor(s)
(‘inventor criterion’) of a patent, or to that of the applicant(s)
(‘applicant criterion’). Several applicants could hold rights on a
patent application, and they would have legal title to the patent
once it is granted. In the same way, several inventors could have
taken part in the development process of the invention, and be
listed in the patent application. A fractional count is applied in
order to assign patents to countries in cases where several
inventors (or applicants) with different countries of residence
have to be considered for the same application. In general, the
choice of the criterion depends on the perspective from which
innovative capability is being investigated. Thus, to study cross-
border technology sourcing by a country, we count the number of
inventions developed by foreign inventors owned by domestic
applicants. This approach corresponds to the measures speciﬁed in
(2) and (3). We consider only bilateral relations where there were
at least 5 joint patents between China and country j at time t. In
order to compute the total number of a country's inventions, i.e. its
inventive capacity, we apply the inventor criterion.
Our source of data is the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database, known as PATSTAT, April 2013 version. This database
provides a worldwide coverage of patent applications submitted to
over 90 Patent Ofﬁces in the world and the analysis takes into
account priority patent applications ﬁled to all of them. The time
period taken into account covers from 1 January 1990 to 31
December 2009.
Regarding the source of the remaining data, information on
geographic distance stems from the CEPII bilateral trade data set
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Data on GDP and FDI originates from
the World Bank.
5. Empirical results
Our analysis of technology sourcing between China and the rest
of the world has two steps. First, we analyse China's technology
sourcing balance and which countries are the main countries from
which applicants residing in China source technology and which
are the main destinations for Chinese technology. This is followed
by an analysis of the distribution of technology ﬂows by techno-
logical ﬁeld. Second, we report the results of regressions estimat-
ing the models speciﬁed in Section 3. Relevant descriptive
statistics together with pair-wise correlations between variables
used in the current study, which provide additional insights into
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the subject of our analysis, are provided in a technical annex in
Section 8.
5.1. China's technology sourcing balance and partners
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the evolution of technology sourcing
between China and the rest of the world between 1990 and 2009.
It shows that both the number of Chinese inventions owned by
foreign applicants and the number of foreign inventions owned by
applicants residing in China increased signiﬁcantly. However,
the growth of technology sourcing from China to the rest of the
world has been considerably higher than the growth of foreign
technology acquisition by applicants residing in China. While the
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the number of Chinese
inventions owned by foreign applicants for the period between
1990 and 2009 was 26%, the CAGR for foreign inventions owned by
Fig. 1. The evolution of technology sourcing between China and the rest of the world between 1990 and 2009. Note: Figures based on priority patent ﬁlings ﬁled to the EPO,
the USPTO and over 90 national patent ofﬁces between 1990 and 2009. Invention counts are based on the inventor, the priority date and fractional counts.
Source: Own calculations based on PATSTAT, 2013.
Fig. 2. Top 10 sources and destinations of technology sourcing between China and the rest of the world, total number of priority patent applications between 1990 and 2009.
Note: Priority patent applications ﬁled to the EPO, the USPTO and over 90 national patent ofﬁces between 1990 and 2009. Invention counts are based on the inventor or
applicant criterion, the priority date and fractional counts.
Source: IPTS calculations based on PATSTAT, 2013.
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applicants residing in China was 16%. As a result, though starting
from the same low level, the total number of Chinese inventions
owned by foreign applicants grew to nearly 7500 priority patent
applications, as compared to nearly 1700 foreign inventions
owned by applicants residing in China (see Fig. 2). On average,
between 1990 and 2009, the ratio of technology in-ﬂow to China
to technology out-ﬂow was around 3. Thus, in the language of
international trade, China recorded a 300% deﬁcit in the interna-
tional technology sourcing.
Fig. 2 presents China's main technology sourcing partners.
The US appears in the top positions both as a source and
destination for Chinese technology sourcing. It accounts for
55% of Chinese inventions owned by foreign applicants and for
nearly 40% of all the foreign inventions owned by applicants
residing in China. Japan and South Korea hold the second
positions in technology inﬂow and outﬂow, respectively. The
rest of the ranking shows that none of the remaining countries
has a particularly strong relationship with China, either as a
source or a destination of technology ﬂows. What is worth
noting is that Western countries are more active as Chinese
technology sourcing partners, than Asian countries. This is
ampliﬁed by the relatively modest position of Japan. Altogether,
it can also be observed that only a few countries account for
most of the international technology sourcing with China. If we
look at China's partners in technology sourcing, we can see that
the top nine countries account for 84% of all foreign inventions
owned by applications residing in China and for 94% of all Chinese
inventions owned by applicants residing in only nine countries. In
spite of this, it is worth pointing out that the share of the rest of the
world in the total number of foreign inventions owned by applicants
residing in China is relatively high, considering that it mainly
includes smaller countries in terms of GDP. In other words, the
reasons why Chinese entities acquire property rights over inventions
developed by inventors in other countries are not only related to the
economic positions of these countries.
In order to see what types of technologies are sourced between
China and the rest of the world, Fig. 3 presents a breakdown of the
inventions subject to cross-border ownership by main technolo-
gical classes. Technologies are assigned a code according to the
International Patent Classiﬁcation (Schmoch, 2008). According to
Fig. 3 technologies sourced to China belong to a few technological
ﬁelds. The top nine technologies in terms of the total number of
inventions by foreign inventors owned by applicants residing in
China account for 55% of technology inﬂow to China. Here the
main technological ﬁelds include electrical machinery (9%), semi-
conductors (8%) and audio-visual technology (7%). Foreign entities
sourcing technology from China also focus on a small number of
technological ﬁelds. The ﬁrst nine technologies in terms of the
total number of inventions by Chinese inventors owned by foreign
applicants account for 64%. Most of them can be considered
as high technologies, mainly information and communication
technologies (ICT). The largest technological ﬁelds include
computer technology (27%), telecommunications (9%) and digital
communication (7%).
Fig. 3. Main technologies sourced between China and the rest of the world, based on the total number of inventions in the time period between 1990 and 2009. Note:
Priority patent applications ﬁled to the EPO, the USPTO and over 80 national patent ofﬁces between 1990 and 2009. Invention counts are based on the inventor or applicant
criterion, the priority date and fractional counts. The breakdown is based on the international patent classiﬁcation codes (IPC) and includes 35 technological classes.
Source: IPTS calculations based on PATSTAT, 2013.
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5.2. The determinants of international technology sourcing
To estimate the functions speciﬁed in (6) and (7), we ran a
regression with time ﬁxed effects, see Table 1 for the results. The
dependent variables are: The ﬁrst one, i.e. the relative importance
of country j as a source of technology acquired by applicants
residing in China, is measured by the revealed geographic dis-
tribution as deﬁned in (4) at time t. This relates to the issue of
technology sourcing to China from abroad. The second variable is
the relative role of China as country j’s source of technology as
deﬁned in (5) at time t. This concerns sourcing technology from
China to other countries. In both cases, we deal with variables with
highly skewed values. This comes from the fact that even if
countries maintain a large number of technological collaboration
relationships, only few of them show high intensity (De Prato and
Nepelski, 2014). Hence, in both cases the dependent variables are
log-transformed variables. For gravity model, we report ﬁrst
estimations with variables controlling for geographic proximity
and GDP of China's partners at time t. The extended speciﬁcation
includes controls of net FDI in-ﬂows, inventive performance and
the region of origin of country j, i.e. country from which China
sources technology.
Concerning the technology ﬂow to China, the distance has a
negative impact on the intensity of technology sourcing, though
the coefﬁcient value is not signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients controlling
for the size of the country from which China sources technology is
negative, though not signiﬁcant in the second speciﬁcation. Thus,
the economic size of China's partner countries has a negative
impact on the intensity of the relationship. In other words, among
Chinese international technology sources, there are many rela-
tively small countries. Moreover, as shown by the results of the
second regression, i.e. (ii), these countries are not characterised by
exceptionally high inventive performance. The coefﬁcient values of
the country dummies reveal that there is a strong orientation
toward Asian countries, including Japan. A notable exception is the
US, which also plays an important role as a source of technology
acquired by Chinese entities. In contrast, European countries play
an insigniﬁcant role.
With respect to the determinants of the role of China as a
source of technology for other countries, we can see that there is a
negative impact of distance and a positive one of a partner's GDP.
In contrast to the previous analysis focusing on the technology
sourcing by China, we can observe a high level of concentration of
the interactions. Among all the country dummies included, only
the US one shows positive and signiﬁcant sign. This reinforces the
observation showing the strong ties between China and the US
concerning technology sourcing observed in Fig. 2.
6. Discussion
The results of our analysis show that the process of technology
sourcing between China and the rest of the word has been
intensifying over the last two decades. At least some of the
ﬁndings for China can be generalised to other developing coun-
tries such as Brazil, India or Russia. Hence, we can conclude that
the science and technology base of these countries is not only
advancing internally, but is being strengthened by resources
acquired abroad. Reversing the relationship, there is also increas-
ing demand from external actors for technology developed in
developing countries. Through complementarity or substitution,
this technology is becoming embedded in products developed and
produced globally and developing countries are becoming impor-
tant nodes in the global technological network (De Prato and
Nepelski, 2013).
Irrespective of the direction of the technology sourcing, we can
observe that the technological ﬂows between China and the rest of
the world concern high technologies, mainly ICT. This can be
interpreted as a sign of rapid upgrading of the Chinese science and
technology base, which has resulted in the development of high-
tech inventions. Through international technology ﬂows, these
Table 1
Estimation results.
Source: Own calculations based on PATSTAT Database, 2013.
International technology sourcing
To China LogRGD_AICNjt From ChinaLogRGD_IACNjt
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Log distanceCNj 0.080 (0.146) 2.112nn (0.820) 0.441nnn (0.083) 0.716nn (0.357)
Log GDPj,t 0.247n (0.121) 0.061 (0.462) 0.103n (0.052) 0.070 (0.085)
Log FDIj,t 0.001 (0.028) 0.118 (0.014)
Log IPj,t 0.605nn (0.290) 0.095 (0.157)
EU 0.240 (0.526) 0.220 (0.188)
Asia 7.617nnn (2.390) 0.293 (0.431)
US 1.388nn (0.721) 0.946nnn (0.329)
Japan 5.427nnn (1.740) 0.326 (0.365)
Constant 4.447 (3.286) 16.693 (12.44) 2.61n (1.543) 0.177 (3.556)
N 49 49 107 107
R2 0.567 0.847 0.410 0.560
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.738 0.305 0.445
The table shows the results of panel regressions with time ﬁxed effects for the period between 1990 and 2009. The ﬁrst set of regressions, i.e. (i) and (ii), concerns the relative
importance of country j as a source of technology sourcing measured by the revealed geographic distribution (RGD_AICNjt) as deﬁned in CNDJ6nn5us4RjIIAqgBLqQsCAAAA-
CAAAAA4AAABfAFIAZQBmADMANwAyADgAOAA3ADMANwA3AAAA (4). The second one, i.e. (iii) and (iv), reﬂects the relative role of China as country's j source of
technology sourcing (RGD_IACNjt) as deﬁned in CNDJ6nn5us4RjIIAqgBLqQsCAAAACAAAAA4AAABfAFIAZQBmADMANwAyADgAOAA3ADMAOAAyAAAA (5). Explanatory
variables include log of distance between China and country j, GDP, FDI and research intensity (IPj) of country j. We consider only bilateral relations where there were at
least 5 joint patents between China and country j at time t. Standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included. Rest of the world¼base category.
n Signiﬁcance level 0.90.
nn Signiﬁcance level 0.95.
nnn Signiﬁcance level 0.99.
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inventions become slowly embedded in globally created and
developed products.
As regards China's technology exchange partners, we observe
that China is contributing to the emergence of a multi-polar global
technology network. In this network, the main linkages are not
only between developed countries or between developed and
developing countries, but also increasingly between developing
countries. This reﬂects the increasing importance of South–South
interactions. In other words, the growing role of China in the
network of technological collaborations is reshaping the structure
of this network and embedding other developing countries in it.
Concerning the determinants of international technology sour-
cing, geographical distance does not reveal the whole picture
about the globalization of technology (Picci, 2010). In particular,
there are qualitative differences with respect to the two directions
of technology ﬂow between China and the rest of the world. When
looking at the technology ﬂow to China, one can observe that
Chinese entities source technology from a variety of countries,
although there is a regional bias towards Asia. In contrast, the
other direction of technology ﬂow, i.e. from China to other
countries, we ﬁnd that one country – the US – is very dominant.
In spite of the geographic distance, both in absolute and relative
terms, there is a very high demand from the US for technology
developed in China. This is further emphasised by the relatively
low level of technology acquisition by neighbouring Asian coun-
tries including Japan.
These results contribute to both the theory of international
business and the practice of internationalising technological activ-
ities. First of all, regarding the theory of international business, we
show that by focusing on one country and taking into account its
economic and technological context, we may be able ﬁll the gaps
in conceptualising technology globalisation. Up until now, theories
of international business have mainly been built on studies of the
internationalisation strategies and behaviour of ﬁrms from devel-
oped countries that ﬁrst created their international technological
networks in other developed countries. These ﬁrms began to look
for and acquire knowledge and technological resources from
developing countries only in the later stages. Our results show
that Chinese entities acquire technology from other developing
countries relatively frequently. This is an example of South–South
internationalisation, a relatively new trend that has not attracted
enough attention. It is unclear if context-free concepts of interna-
tional business can fully explain these patterns (Ramamurti and
Singh, 2010). Similarly, the traditional theory of international
business does not fully explain why Chinese entities are increas-
ingly sourcing technology from developed countries. For example,
in the framework of Dunning's Ownership-Location-Inter-
nationalisation (OLI), companies ﬁrst develop some competitive
advantages and then expand to exploit them abroad (Dunning,
1977). Though this may be true in the context of, for example, US
companies doing R&D activities in China to adapt their products
for the Chinese market, it may not necessarily be why Chinese
companies source technology from developed countries. It is more
likely that they source technology from abroad to acquire compe-
titive advantage that can be later exploited globally. In recent
years, MNEs from developing countries have been doing this more
and more often.
Second, following the theories of international trade (Chaney,
2013), the theory of international business expects a negative
relationship between geographic distance and technology sour-
cing (McCann, 2011). Our results show however, that while
geographic distance seems to hinder other countries from sourcing
technology from China, it does not impede Chinese entities from
acquiring property rights over inventions developed by inventors
in distant countries. The portfolio of countries from which China
sources technology includes distant countries, which are not
considered to be the world's technology power-houses or eco-
nomic super-powers, e.g. Brazil. On the other hand, if we look at
the intensity of technology sourcing, China sources most often
from the US. Thus, this justiﬁes looking at the patterns of
international technology sourcing for individual countries and
our results point to factors that need to be addressed in order to
explain the drivers of this activity.
Concerning the practical implications, we can conclude that
the intensity of technological interactions between China and
the rest of the world is driven by the growth of the Chinese
economy and its openness to foreign investments. China's eco-
nomic growth leads us to expect that it will become stronger as a
provider of technology demanded by other countries and as a
receiver of technology developed outside its borders. As this
process is concentrated around knowledge-intensive technologies,
it will have considerable implications for developed countries.
The new breed of MNEs from emerging countries, including China,
are having disruptive effects on industries that have been tradi-
tionally considered as mature. Chinese companies have already
changed the landscape in some technologically advanced markets,
e.g. Huawei and Lenovo, and also resources-oriented markets,
e.g. Chinalco and CNOOC. Finally, one of the key issues in the
process of technology sourcing between China and the rest of the
world is that Chinese entities are strongly oriented towards
developing countries. These countries have been neglected by
developed countries as a destination for FDI and as a source of
technological resources. The resource-seeking investments of
Chinese entities in developing countries may create positive
contributions for these countries’ development, due to the emer-
gence of an additional bidder and competition for their resources.
Moreover, it is likely that Chinese companies investing in devel-
oping countries follow different strategies to their counterparts
from developed countries. In general, they tend to have closer
collaboration relationships with ﬁrms from host countries
(Kimura, 2013).
7. Conclusions
The rapidly increasing innovation potential of developing
countries such as China, India or Russia is attracting a lot of
attention, as these developments are expected to re-shape the
geographic distribution of knowledge and technology develop-
ment. However, little is known about the patterns of international
technology sourcing from and to developing countries. In order to
advance our understanding of this subject, our paper focuses on
the case of technology sourcing between China and the rest of the
world. The questions addressed in our analysis include: What is
the volume of technology ﬂow between China and the rest of the
world and how is it evolving over time? What kinds of technology
ﬂow between China and its technology exchange partners? And
ﬁnally, what factors drive this technology exchange?
Although we provide new evidence on the patterns and drivers
of technology sourcing between a developing country and the rest
of the world, clearly a number of questions remain unanswered
and call for future research. Above all, it is worth asking whether
the technology sourcing between developing and other countries
is a way of substituting what is produced locally, i.e. de-
localization of R&D activities, or whether this process is driven
by a search for complementary resources. In our view, these
questions deserve to be answered in the future. One issue that
should be kept in mind while studying the role of developing
countries in the process of business and technology globalisation
is the fact that frequent political actions strongly inﬂuence their
business landscapes. The case of China illustrates this point very
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clearly. From intellectual property issues, through science and
technology policy, access to ﬁnancing and direct subsidies, Chinese
ﬁrms beneﬁt from public support which increases their compe-
tiveness in global markets. We should ask how effective and
sustainable these policies are with respect to promoting techno-
logical advantage. We should also ask whether and to what extent
these measures can be applied by other countries.
The paper has some limitations. First of all, patent data, despite
the richness of information it provides, has its own drawbacks.
Using patent-based measures of technology sourcing, our analysis
does not account for the problem of value of technology sourced
across the borders. Second, due to the fact that there is no
theoretical foundation to explain how linkages between countries
are formed, we are forced to adhere to the gravity model, which
also has ﬂaws. Finally, our approach does not take into account
either a country's IPR environment or its policy on international
collaboration in science and technology. This is likely to affect the
results of the analysis.
In conclusion, we believe that our work provides a number
of insights into the determinants of international technology
sourcing from and to developing countries. It opens up a new
approach to studying their role in the process of global knowledge
and technology development. This approach focuses not only on
the potential threat from their growing innovation capacities, but
also on their role in the process of international technology
exchange.
Disclaimer
The views expressed are those of the authors and may not in
any circumstances be regarded as stating an ofﬁcial position of the
European Commission.
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See the Appendix Tables A1 and A2.
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